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Abstract
The majority of independent nations today were part of empires in 1945. Using
bilateral trade data from 1948 to 2006, we examine the effect of independence on
post-colonial trade. On average, there is little short run effect of trade with the
colonizer (metropole). However, after three decades trade declines more than 60%.
We also find that trade between former colonies of the same empire erodes as much
as trade with the metropole, whereas trade with third countries exhibits small
and unsystematic changes after independence. Hostile separations lead to larger
and more immediate reductions. Trade deterioration over extended time periods
suggests the depreciation of some form of trading capital such as business networks
or institutions.
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1 Introduction
The dismantling of European empires after World War II led to sweeping changes in the
governance of developing countries in Africa and Asia. Recent research in economics has
investigated the long-run consequences of colonial rule. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that
the British endowed their colonies with a legal system that produces superior economic
outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) find that colonizers were more likely to establish
pro-growth institutions in sparsely populated areas with lower settler mortality. Banerjee
and Iyer (2005) find that 50 years after India abolished land revenue systems imposed in
the mid-19th by British rules, their “institutional overhang” can be seen in agricultural
productivity differences. In this paper, we investigate a different legacy of colonial rule:
the bias in post-colonial bilateral trade patterns.
Algeria’s trade with France offers prima facie evidence of large post-colonial trade
erosion. In 1962, the year of independence, Algeria accounted for 8.84% of French imports,
a share that had been stable over the 14-year period preceding independence for which we
have data. The share fell by two thirds over the next two decades (to 2.72% in 1984) and
another two thirds over the succeeding two decades, reaching 0.96% in 2006. A variety
of potential explanations for this fact suggest themselves. First, it might reflect poor
economic performance over the last four decades by Algeria, which may have reduced
its exports to all markets. Second, Algeria’s abandonment of the Franc in 1964 may
have raised currency transaction costs. Third, France’s participation in GATT and the
European Community probably redirected its import purchasing patterns, lowering the
share taken by any absolute level of imports from Algeria. Fourth, deterioration of
business networks and trade-creating institutions may have raised bilateral trade costs.
Utilizing data encompassing almost every country in the world from 1948 and 2006,
we identify the impact of independence based on within variation in bilateral trade. We
estimate a semi-parametric specification, dividing years since independence into seven
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intervals. Unlike the work cited in the opening paragraph, we will take as a given any
changes in per capita incomes caused by changing internal institutions. We also control
for formal external institutions (membership in regional trade agreements, GATT, and
currency unions). This allows us to focus on the effects of unobserved informal external
institutions such as the business networks emphasized by Rauch (1999).
Our results show that three decades after independence, trade between colony and
metropole has fallen by more than 60%. Trade between colonies of the same empire falls
even more. There is little evidence of corresponding diversion of trade to other countries.
We also investigate the mechanisms that underlie the post-independence erosion of trade
with the metropole. We exploit a data set showing the number of French nationals living
in different countries which we consider as a proxy for the metropole’s social and business
network. We find the population of French expatriates in former colonies declines in much
the same way as bilateral trade. The shrinking expatriate presence partially explains the
diminished trade between France and its former colonies. An alternative explanation
of falling trade after separation is that wars of independence caused permanent trade-
reducing antipathy between the metropole and former colony. Categorizing independence
events into amicable and hostile separations, we find that the latter are more immediately
destructive to trade but both lead to large trade erosion in the long run.
Countries in colonial empires choose if and when to separate, raising the concern of
endogeneity bias. As we discuss in Section 2, historical accounts suggest a significant
random component to independence events. Nevertheless, systematic determinants of
independence are a possible source of bias. The political and economic attributes of the
colonizer (metropole) and colony, as well as the strength of their bilateral association, may
affect the likelihood of independence. We remove these factors, however, in specifications
that eliminate time-varying country effects and non-time varying bilateral effects. Time-
varying bilateral effects remain as a potential source of bias. For example, declining
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trade prospects may have induced metropoles to relinquish control of colonies. We will
argue that our results showing little short-run and substantial long-run bilateral trade
erosion subsequent to independence do not support this reverse causation hypothesis.
Instead, they are consistent with the proposition that independence led to deterioration
of trade-creating capital such as institutions and networks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our panel of inde-
pendence events and bilateral trade data. Section 3 specifies a gravity model employing
country-pair (dyad) fixed effects. Due to the computational difficulties of estimating
country-year fixed effects to capture multilateral resistance terms, we eliminate them by
implementing a method of “tetrads” that takes the ratio of ratios of trade flows. Our
results on the impact of independence on bilateral trade are presented in section 4. The
concluding section summarizes and discusses potential welfare implications.
2 Data on independence and trade
The principal variable of interest is the timing of independence events. We do not consider
the end of a military occupation as being sufficient condition for an independence event.
Thus France does not become independent from Germany in 1945 in our data set. Rather,
independence arises following a colonial period which should involve long-term, civilian
administration that includes significant settlement. Information on colonial relationships
comes from a variety of sources but we used the CIA World Factbook as the primary
authority for independence dates.
There are 253 country pairs with colonial histories, of which 33 remain current. Fig-
ure 1 displays the number of countries that gained independence since 1900, a total of
174.1 The two main colonizers in this sample, the UK and France, are shown in red and
1Table 4 in the data appendix lists independence events since 1900 as well as the continuing colonial
relationships for which we have trade data.
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Figure 1: Independence events since 1900
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Figure 2: Frequency of trade links by years since independence
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
N
um
be
r o
f t
ra
di
ng
 d
ya
ds
50+ years
Current
20−49 years
1−19 years
4
blue, respectively, with all others grouped and represented as black bars. The two highest
black spikes correspond to the possessions lost by the defeated nations after World War I
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The timing of the independences shown in Figure 1 reflect a variety of political and
economic forces. Historical accounts point to an important role for idiosyncratic events.
For example, France’s President De Gaulle first threatened to cut ties (and aid) to African
colonies that voted to leave the “French Community.” However, after Guinea declared
sovereignty in 1958, De Gaulle reversed position and offered economic cooperation agree-
ments to all countries that voted for independence. Fourteen colonies promptly gained
independence in 1960. Rothermund (2006, p. 153) remarks that “in 1960 the French
almost had to impose independence on a reluctant Gabon” because De Gaulle “did not
tolerate exceptions to the granting of independence in 1960.” This was despite oil and
uranium resources that “the French were interested in keeping under their control.” In
contrast to the wave of independence for French colonies in the 1960s, Portugal adamantly
clung to its five “overseas provinces” in Africa until after the Salazar dictatorship was
replaced with a democratic and pro-decolonization government in 1974.
To estimate the influence of the independence events on bilateral trade, we use the
International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). It covers the 1948–
2006 period, which is of crucial importance, since this includes pre-independence trade
for many countries, as well as the immediate years following independence. While DOTS
lacks data on trade for individual goods, it is the only data set containing a panel of
worldwide bilateral trade that goes back far enough to study the main independence
events of the twentieth century.
The DOTS often reports two values for the same flow from country A to B. This is
because country A may report its imports from B and country B reports its exports to
A. Import reports (from country A) are deemed more reliable since governments track
5
them closely because they are subject to customs duties (and other customs clearance
procedures). If the importing country does not make a report or reports a zero, we replace
it when possible using positive reports made by the exporter.2 When using exporter
reported trade, we adjust for the fact that exports are reported FOB while imports are
reported CIF, with a 10% difference in value, which is the actual mean margin revealed
by countries reporting imports in both CIF and FOB values.
Figure 2 shows the number of dyads (observations for exporter i and importer j) of
positive bilateral trade flows in each year according to the timing of independence. We
show four categories of colonial relationships: current colonies (solid lines) as well as
former colonies after 1–19 years (long dashes), 20–49 years (shorter dashes), and more
than 50 years (dots and dashes) of independence. The main point we draw from this
figure is that sample sizes appear large enough to estimate the effects of varying numbers
of years since independence. The bump up in trade dyads for current colonies arises
because of increases in data availability in 1958 (France begins to report data on its
dependencies) and 1960 (newly independent French colonies begin to report). The 1961
jump in dyads that have been independent 1–19 years is followed two decades later by
a jump in the number of dyads with 20–49 years, as the African former French colonies
“progress” through intervals of independence.
The data base we compiled is larger than most comparable work using DOTS. Our
typical regression includes around 620,000 observations. Glick and Rose’s (2002) study
of currency unions uses DOTS but has about 220,000 observations in part because their
study ends in 1997 and their main specification averages bilateral exports and imports.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also use DOTS (without averaging) but only at 5 years
intervals (9 different years starting in 1960), which reduces their sample to 47,081 obser-
vations. As emphasized by Baldwin (2006), considering the direction of trade is important
2Although the DOTS contains both zeros and missing data, inspection of the data shows many
examples with zero reports that should be positive.
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to maintain a connection to the underlying theory. It is important for us to have an-
nual data to be able to estimate the extent that trade changes in the first years after
independence.
3 Specification
In order to estimate the effects of independence, we need a benchmark for the amount of
trade expected had independence not occurred. We will follow the common practice of
modeling “expected” bilateral trade using a specification based on the gravity equation.
All the well-known empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity equation can
be represented in the following equation for the value of xij, the exports from supplying
country i to importing country j:3
xij = GSiMjφij. (1)
In this equation, Si and Mj are indexes of the attributes of supplier i and importer j,
and G is a factor that does not vary across countries (but can vary across time periods).
Variation in bilateral trade intensity enters through φij. We refer to Si andMj as monadic
effects and φij as the dyadic effect.
The general approach to estimation is to take logs to obtain an equation that is linear
in the parameters.
lnxij = lnG+ lnSi + lnMj − lnφij. (2)
Then the researcher chooses proxies for the monadic and dyadic effects and inserts an
error term to represent remaining variation in trade. The next two subsections explain
how we model the monadic (lnSi and lnMj) and dyadic effects (lnφij).
3See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Chaney (2008).
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3.1 Monadic issues
In many empirical applications, which we will refer to as the “simple gravity” approach,
the exporter and importer attributes are assumed to be given by Si = N
α1
i y
α2
i and
Mj = N
α3
j y
α4
j , where N represents population and y is GDP per capita.
4 Plugging in
these monadic effects we re-express equation (2) as
lnxij = lnG+ α1 lnNi + α2 ln yi + α3 lnNj + α4 ln yj − lnφij. (3)
Theoretical derivations of the gravity equation imply that the monadic factors also depend
on non-linear functions of the dyadic part of (1). This occurs for two main reasons. In
the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derivation, for instance, the basic reason why
Mj depends on the whole set of dyadic variables and parameters is that the consumer’s
allocation of income depends on relative prices. The reason why the exporter’s monadic
effect Si depends on the dyadic vector is the market-clearing requirement. This condition
says that total sales in all markets from exporter i should equal the supplier’s aggregate
output. Anderson and van Wincoop call the terms involving the whole vectors of dyadic
φij “multilateral resistance indices.” Their omission in equation (3) has the potential to
bias estimates.
The solution proposed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) requires that a struc-
tural model be used to specify the monadic effects as a function of GDPs and the dyadic
vector. There are three problems. First, the results may depend on the structure. While
there are multiple micro-foundations for equation (1), they differ in terms of the under-
lying monadic terms. Second, the monadic terms depend upon the whole dyadic vector
including the “internal” distances of countries. Applications suggest that results are not
robust to alternate ways of calculating “internal” distances. Third, the method presents
4Alternatively, one can substitute GDP for population which will result in different coefficient esti-
mates but with identical fit.
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computational difficulties.
An alternative estimates the monadic effects lnSi and lnMj in equation (2) using fixed
effects for i and j. With a balanced panel of bilateral exports, a within transformation can
be used for removing the monadic effects. Due to missing data, zeros, and variation in the
number of partner trade for each reporting country, actual bilateral data sets are almost
never balanced. Baltagi (1995, p. 160) points out that the within transformation does
not work with unbalanced two-way panels. One should therefore use the least squares
dummy variable (LSDV) method. Since DoTS has close to 200 trade entities and over
50 years of trade, the LSDV approach involves about 20,000 dummies. This presents
computational difficulties of a different kind: programming is trivial but the execution
requires a massive matrix inversion.
Baier and Bergstrand (2006) offer a third approach they call bonus vetus OLS. It
is based on a linear approximation around a centering point and is implemented via
demeaning transformations of the dyadic variables. Their approach assumes that all
determinants of trade costs are observed so that they can be incorporated into the ap-
proximation. Unobserved multilateral and bilateral trade costs that are correlated with
colonial separations would bias the estimates of independence effects.
We apply a different approach to estimation. It takes advantage of the multiplicative
structure of equation (1) and then takes the ratio of ratios to eliminate the monadic
effects (including the multilateral resistance terms). This requires a set of four trading
partners. For that reason, we call it the method of tetrads.
Consider four countries indexed i, j, k, and `. Using (1), the ratio of i’s exports to j
over its exports to importer k is given by
Ri{jk} =
xij
xik
=
Mjφij
Mkφik
. (4)
We have canceled out G, and more importantly, Si, the exporter fixed effect. TheMj/Mk
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ratio remains problematic for estimation however, and we now need an expression par-
allel to (4) containing Mj/Mk that we can divide Ri{jk} by in order to cancel out these
remaining monadic terms. This can be achieved by picking a reference exporter ` and
calculating the corresponding ratio to the same pair of importers:
R`{jk} =
x`j
x`k
=
Mjφ`j
Mkφ`k
. (5)
Taking the ratio of ratios we can define the tetradic term
r{i`}{jk} =
Ri{jk}
R`{jk}
=
xij/xik
x`j/x`k
=
φij/φik
φ`j/φ`k
, (6)
where the tetrad comprises two exporters, {i`}, and two importers, {jk}. Taking logs,
we have
ln r{i`}{jk} = lnφij − lnφik − lnφ`j + lnφ`k. (7)
We now specify φij to show how the r{i`}{jk} can be used to estimate the parameters
determining bilateral trade intensity. The log dyadic effect is given by
lnφij = βBij + uij (8)
The Bij and uij in this equation represent respectively observed and unobserved bilateral
linkages. Plugging this expression back into equation (7), we have
ln r{i`}{jk} = β(Bij −Bik −B`j +B`k) + uij − uik − u`j + u`k. (9)
For binary linkage variables, the sum above can take on five possible values: 2, 1, 0, −1
and −2, depending on the pattern of linkages within the tetrad.
Our approach can be seen as an extension of existing ratio approaches that take
10
advantage of the multiplicative functional form of the gravity equation to get rid of either
the exporters’ (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) or importers’ (Head and Mayer, 2000,
and Martin et al., 2008) fixed effects. Combining the two approaches yields a specification
free of any monadic term.5 Two recent papers also employ the ratio of ratios to eliminate
the monadic terms. Romalis (2007) estimates the response of US imports from Canada
and Mexico to NAFTA tariff reductions. Hallak (2006) uses the approach to quantify the
economic magnitude of coefficients obtained from fixed effects gravity equations.
The method presents two special issues. First, one needs to select the reference
countries k and ` in order to do the tetrad calculations.6 In their single-ratio methods,
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Martin et al. (2008) take the United States as
the reference country. The EU is the reference importer and the rest of the world is the
reference exporter in Romalis (2007). We employ three pairs of reference countries to
examine robustness. First, we take the two big colonizers over our sample, France and
the United Kingdom. We then use two of the biggest exporters, Germany and the US.
Finally, we consider two economies that did not have colonial relationships during our
sample, Canada and Switzerland.
A second issue concerns the independence of the observations. As represented in (9),
the error terms u`k, uik, and u`j, appear repeatedly across observations. Indeed, u`k is
contained in each observation. We will use year dummies to account for u`k but are
still left with correlated errors as a consequence of uik, and u`j. The appropriate form
of clustering is more complex than usual here, since the repeated presences of uik and
u`j call for both exporter-year and importer-year clusters, which are non-nested. We
therefore use multi-way clustering of the kind described in Cameron et al. (2006). We
implement their estimation method using three-way clustering: it, jt, and ij.7
5The computational benefits of the tetrads approach would be even greater for commodity level trade
since monadic terms are presumed to be good-specific.
6Generating all possible tetrad combinations would involve dealing with literally billions of observa-
tions in our case.
7Stata programs are available at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/head/sup/.
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3.2 Dyadic issues
Another concern in this study is that the vector of linkage variables, Bij, is necessarily
incomplete. This means unobserved dyadic (ij) linkages will contaminate the error term.
That is, even if we control for importer and exporter effects there are unobserved bilateral
influences on both trade and the decision to become independent. With panel data,
one can remove the unobserved but fixed component of bilateral linkages using dyadic
(country-pair) fixed effects. This identifies the effect of independence based on time
series variation. We will therefore also use this type of specification, and follow Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) and Glick and Rose (2002) who underscore the importance of
capturing policy changes using time-series rather than cross-sectional variation.
Finally we need to specify the set of observable linkages between country pairs in our
sample. Using abbreviations, we specify the linkages vector in year t as
Bijt = {lnDij,Langij,Legalij,Colonyij,RTAijt,GATTijt,CUijt, Indepijt}
which controls for distance, common language, having common legal origins in national
law, the existence of a historical colonial relationship, belonging to a common regional
trade arrangement, both countries belonging to GATT/WTO, belonging to a currency
union, and independence. Of these, distance, common language, shared legal origins,
and colonial history do not vary over time and drop out in specifications with dyadic
fixed effects. We also employ year indicator variables to capture changes in average trade
propensities over time.
To measure the effect of independence, we employ seven indicator variables corre-
sponding to years subsequent to independence: 1–2, 3–6, 7–11, 12–19, 20–29, 30–49
and 50 or more years. The advantage of this semi-parametric specification is its flexible
treatment of how trade evolves subsequent to independence. For example, if networks
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underlie the reason why countries with colonial ties trade more with each other, we would
expect a gradual decline in these networks over time once independence is achieved. The
specification can capture a short-run disruption in trade followed by long-run return to
pre-independence levels. It also allows for permanent reductions that are achieved imme-
diately following independence. The omitted category for the independence indicators is
the year of independence and previous years.8
4 Results
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, it is instructive to examine two cases. Fig-
ure 3 shows Ivorian (I) and Ghanaian (G) trade patterns with France (F ) and the United
Kingdom (U). The figure reports the ratio of the two countries’ trade flows to and from
France divided by the corresponding flow with the UK (xIF/xIU , xFI/xUI , and xGF/xGU ,
xFG/xUG). The Ivory Coast was a colony of France until 1960 and Ghana a colony of
the UK until 1957. Ghana and the Ivory Coast make a useful case study since they are
adjacent, comparable in size, and yet were colonized by different countries. Differences
in distances between colonies and metropoles seem negligible. Furthermore, changes in
multilateral resistance indices should be fairly similar.9 If colonial ties did not influence
trade, we would expect that the ratio of exports to France to exports to the UK (shown
with x-marked lines) to be approximately equal to the relative size of their markets. Sim-
ilarly, relative imports from the two sources (solid lines) would be equal to their relative
production. Using GDP as the measure of relative market and production size, we would
expect all four trade lines to be close to the France-to-UK GDP ratio (black dashed line).
Instead, we see large gaps on both sides.
France’s former colony Ivory Coast trades much more with its former metropole than
8There are only 1474 positive trade values for colonial trade prior to independence.
9A surge in Nigerian GDP would have approximately the same effect on Ghana and Ivory Coast,
whereas a surge in German GDP would have similar effects on the UK and France.
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France’s relative size would imply. The ratio of export ratios to GDP ratios is 79.3 in the
year it became independent. By 2006, the ratio had fallen to 5.9. Its imports also begin
heavily biased towards France (ratio of 38.6) and, while the import bias also declines, it
persists at 11.7 in 2006. On the other hand, Ghanaian trade exhibits bias towards the
UK. The ratios of relative trade to relative GDP are 13.4 (exports) and 23.1 (imports)
in 1957. Their decline in recent years has been remarkable and the bias has fallen to 1.9
(exports) and 1.3 (imports) in 2006. Even these numbers should be seen as impressive:
Forty-six years after independence Ghana still exports about 90% more to its former
ruler than a simple gravity model would predict. From our gravity estimates below, this
is larger than if Ghana and the UK belonged to a regional trade agreement, or a currency
union.10
Another interesting illustration can be made using two comparable countries, where
one gained independence, while the other remained part of national territory of the colo-
nial power. The two islands of Reunion and Mauritius are particularly good examples,
featured in Figure 4, which uses the same graphical devices as Figure 3. The two islands
are only 250 kms away, and were both under the control of France from the early 18th
century until the United Kingdom took both islands over in 1810. An interesting acci-
dent of history (for our purpose) is that the Congress of Vienna in 1815 gave Reunion
island back to France (which it still is), while Mauritius island remained a British colony
(until the peaceful 1968 independence). The difference in the trade patterns of the two
islands is quite striking. For Reunion, both relative exports and imports seem to fluctuate
around an equilibrium stable level of 50, comparable to the level of Ivory Coast at the
time of independence in Figure 3, but around 50 times higher than the expected level.
By contrast, Mauritius has a very different trade pattern—independence marks a sharp
change in the ratio of relative exports to France and UK. While the “metropole premia”
10Column (3) of Table 1 states that the effect of signing either type of agreement is to create roughly
exp(0.5)− 1 = 65% more trade.
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Figure 3: Trade of Ivory Coast and Ghana with their respective metropoles
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Figure 4: Trade of Reunion and Mauritius islands with their respective metropoles
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was close to a factor of 200 in 1968, it falls gradually over time, so that Mauritian exports
to UK and France in the 2000s are roughly the same, as expected. Figures 3 and 4 both
portray an erosion of colonial trade subsequent to independence. To see if this picture
extends generally, we turn to the regression results.
Tables 1 and 2 contain estimation results. We report results for six specifications
and present estimates of the control variables in the first table and the independence
variables in the second table. The first three columns portray results where exporter and
importer population and per capita GDP proxy for exporter-specific and importer-specific
effects. In the ensuing three columns, these effects are eliminated by creating tetradic
trade flows. This requires choosing reference countries. To investigate the robustness of
the method, we employ three country pairs—Great Britain-France, the United States-
Germany, and Switzerland-Canada—as the reference countries (designated k and ` in
the previous section) and report estimates for all three. All specifications include year
dummies that are not reported in the table.
The first specification pools data, allowing us to compare results for our large panel to
those in the literature. The results, listed in column (1), show that increases in exporter-
and importer-country per capita income and population promote bilateral trade with
elasticities close to one (as predicted in most theoretical derivations). Distance between
partners reduces trade and the estimated elasticity is very close to one (the typical find-
ing). The linkages variables—colonial history, common language, GATT membership,
RTAs, and currency union—increase trade and all estimates are highly statistically sig-
nificant. This specification recognizes the possibility of correlated observations within
dyads by clustering the standard errors according to ij directional pairs.
Interestingly, the pooled OLS coefficients for RTA and GATT are higher than in
published studies. Rose (2004) tends to find negative and insignificant GATT effects in
his study of 178 countries over the 1948–1998 period when dyadic effects are excluded.
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Table 1: Gravity regression control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln Pop, i 0.978a 0.893a 0.290a
(0.006) (0.009) (0.046)
ln Pop, j 0.837a 0.835a 0.962a
(0.006) (0.008) (0.040)
ln GDP/Pop, i 1.118a 0.921a 0.732a
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
ln GDP/Pop, j 0.945a 0.702a 0.634a
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
ln Dist (avg) -1.035a -1.197a
(0.014) (0.015)
Shared Language 0.506a 0.522a
(0.034) (0.038)
Shared Legal Origins 0.313a 0.160a
(0.026) (0.029)
Colonial History 1.560a 2.605a
(0.380) (0.206)
RTA 0.958a 0.593a 0.521a 0.400a 0.411a 0.317a
(0.044) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033)
Both GATT 0.125a 0.155a 0.159a 0.244a 0.368a 0.206a
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042)
Currency union 0.688a 0.483a 0.486a 0.499a 0.469a 0.309a
(0.091) (0.064) (0.068) (0.047) (0.056) (0.089)
Tetrads: GBR,FRA USA,DEU CHE,CAN
Fixed Effects: None Dyads(RE) Dyads Tetrads Tetrads Tetrads
# Obs. 618233 618233 618233 665531 651603 633190
RMSE 2.165 1.480 1.473 1.677 1.722 1.832
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation of errors
within dyads in columns (1) to (3). Columns (4) to (6) use three-way clustering by dyad,
i-year, and j-year using Cameron et al. (2006) method.
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The number of observations in his study, 234,597 in the baseline regression, is less than
half the 618,233 observations in our analysis. Likewise, Baier and Bergstrand (2007,
Table 4, column 2) obtain RTA coefficients of 0.27 for pooled OLS, considerably smaller
than our 0.96 estimate. They use 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 data and 96 countries and
thus only have 47,081 observations.
Column (2) takes into account unobserved persistent dyadic influences using random
effects. Random effects is a GLS transformation of the data in which each variable zijt
is replaced by zijt − θˆij z¯ij. Thus the variables are being quasi-differenced by the dyadic
means. If θˆij = 1, then this specification would be the fixed effects within transformation.
Instead, random effects estimates θˆij based on the number of observations per dyad
and the relative variances of the between and within dimensions of the data. In these
estimations the median θˆij is 0.8, which helps to explain why the results look very similar
to those shown in column (3) for fixed effects. Given this similarity, we will not comment
on them except for the estimate for colonial history. That variable has no within-dyad
variation (it is coded so as to equal one if ever the country pair were in a colonial
relationship). To assess the influence of a colonial relationship after a certain number
of years, one should subtract the relevant independence coefficient from the estimate of
colonial history obtained in this specification, 2.6. This coefficient implies that countries
in ongoing colonial relationships have, on average, 13.5 (= e2.6) times more trade than
other country pairs.
Column (3) introduces dyadic fixed effects and thus estimates are based on time-series
variation within dyads. Linkage variables that do not vary over time (distance, shared
language, colonial history, and shared legal origins) are captured by the dyadic fixed
effects. In comparison to the column (1) pooled OLS estimates, the coefficients fall but
remain statistically significant. The GATT effect of 0.16 is almost the same as the 0.15
estimate that Rose obtains when he employs dyadic fixed effects. The RTA estimate of
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0.52 is relatively close to Baier and Bergstrand’s comparable estimate of 0.68.11 The
effect of currency unions, 0.49, is somewhat lower than the 0.65 found in Glick and Rose
(2002) using the same method.
In the final three specifications, the tetrad method removes all (time-varying) monadic
effects (e.g., population, per capita income, and multilateral resistance terms). We also
employ tetradic fixed effects which eliminate non-time varying bilateral linkage variables.
Looking across columns (4)–(6), regressions that use Great Britain-France, the United
States-Germany, and Switzerland-Canada as reference countries, we find that the signs
of estimated coefficients on RTA, GATT, and currency union are the same as those listed
in column (3) but the magnitudes vary somewhat. The RTA estimates are smaller than
those shown in column (3) whereas the estimates of GATT membership are slightly larger.
The estimates for currency union are quite similar to those estimated by random or fixed
effects, but lower than OLS estimates.
Table 2 lists estimates of the seven independence variables corresponding to trade at
increased intervals since liberation: 1–2 years, 3–6 years, 7–11 years, 12–19 years, 20–29
years, 30–49 years, and 50+ years. Column (1) exhibits the pooled OLS results. For
the newly independent (the first ten years), independence is associated with higher trade
although the effects are only marginally significant. Evidently, trade between colony and
colonizer shortly after independence was higher than colonial trade for existing colonies
and colonies that were independent for longer periods of time. Of course, it may be
the case that these newly independent countries’ trade with their colonizer was higher
than average before independence as well. For this reason, we prefer the estimates in
the ensuing columns that emphasize within-dyad variation over time. The dyadic and
tetradic fixed effects regressions purge observations of average country-pair trade and
estimates are based on time-series changes in trade. Given the high values of θˆij, random
effects largely removes mean dyad effects.
11Their estimate falls to 0.46 when monadic fixed effects are introduced.
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Table 2: Independence effects on bilateral trade flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1–2 Years 0.607 0.106 0.114 0.080 -0.129 -0.359c
(0.379) (0.183) (0.191) (0.085) (0.186) (0.194)
3–6 Years 0.611 0.082 0.082 0.126c -0.307c -0.200
(0.382) (0.192) (0.201) (0.076) (0.164) (0.217)
7–11 Years 0.629c 0.066 0.047 0.137c -0.453a -0.216
(0.381) (0.197) (0.205) (0.076) (0.157) (0.219)
12–19 Years 0.318 -0.239 -0.255 -0.017 -0.705a -0.195
(0.382) (0.204) (0.213) (0.077) (0.165) (0.212)
20–29 Years 0.058 -0.536a -0.565a -0.249a -0.929a -0.324
(0.382) (0.203) (0.211) (0.079) (0.174) (0.217)
30–49 Years -0.464 -0.919a -0.946a -0.544a -1.467a -0.799a
(0.388) (0.203) (0.213) (0.081) (0.174) (0.227)
50+ Years -1.157a -0.808a -0.756a -0.663a -1.320a -0.764a
(0.389) (0.233) (0.254) (0.106) (0.216) (0.282)
Tetrads: GBR,FRA USA,DEU CHE,CAN
Fixed Effects: None Dyads(RE) Dyads Tetrads Tetrads Tetrads
# Obs. 618233 618233 618233 665531 651603 633190
RMSE 2.165 1.480 1.473 1.677 1.722 1.832
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation of errors
within dyads in columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) to (5) use three-way clustering by dyad,
i-year, and j-year using Cameron et al. (2006) method. All columns report coefficients from
the same regressions as the ones with identical numbering in Table 1.
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Columns (2) and (3) reveal that, with dyadic random or fixed effects, independence
is estimated to have small and insignificant positive effects on trade in the first decade.
Then it turns negative, becoming significantly negative in the 20–29 year interval. Trade
with the metropole is minimized in the 30–49 year interval.12 Using the column (3)
estimate, independence for 30–49 years contracts bilateral trade to 39% (e−0.946) of its
independence-year level. The small rebound in bilateral trade estimated for 50 or more
years does not arise in all specifications and is not statistically significant in any specifi-
cation (except OLS).
Given the finite span of our trade data, we do not observe all bilateral relationships
passing through each interval since independence. Thus, since the Soviet Union collapsed
in 1991, post-USSR trade flows contribute to the estimates of the first four intervals, but
not the later ones. However, unreported regressions on the first three columns of Tables 1
and 2 show very little difference in the coefficients estimated when we omit former Soviet
Republics from the regressions.13
The random effects specification reported in column (2) allows us to compare trade
of countries that have been independent for very long periods with those that remain
colonies to this day.14 The effect of being in a colonial relationship is estimated to be
2.605, whereas 50 years of independence has a coefficient of −0.808. Thus, even in the
long-run, countries that once had a colonial relationship trade six times (e2.6−0.8) more
than other dyads. If one includes the effects of a common language and legal system,
which many former colonies retained centuries after independence, the total long-run
impact of colonization on trade rises to a factor of 12 (= e2.6+0.5+0.2−0.8).
12We also estimated a specification with the first four intervals given by 1–4, 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19.
The column (3) results become 0.125, 0.138c, −0.095, −0.284a, −0.527a, −0.908a, and −0.716a. Thus
we still see small positive effects in the first decade, followed by increasingly negative and significant
coefficients, with the largest estimated reduction at 30–49 years.
13Taking column (3) as an example, the independence coefficients are 0.166, 0.087, 0.054, −0.233,
−0.536b, −0.911a, and −0.725a. Therefore 30 to 49 years of independence reduces trade to 40% of its
initial level in this sample, against 39% when including the former USSR in the regression.
14Fixed effects drops the colony history dummy because it is not time-varying within dyads.
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Columns (4)–(6) show the tetrad results and corroborate the findings of large declines
in trade after two decades of independence. The point estimates vary somewhat de-
pending on the choice of reference countries, with larger estimates obtained in in column
(5) using USA and Germany and smaller estimates found for Switzerland-Canada and
Britain-France.
Three alternative explanations for observed reductions in trade with the metropole af-
ter independence are (1) reverse causation, (2) the cessation of formal trade preferences,
and (3) the deterioration of trade-promoting capital such as common institutions and
business networks. Reverse causation arises if metropoles relinquish control of colonies
once they have exploited all the trading opportunities (e.g., extracted all the natural
resources). Trade reduction, therefore, would have occurred even without independence.
In the cases of reverse causation and cessation of preferential trade policies, we would
expect trade reductions to occur soon after the country gained sovereignty. In the pre-
ferred estimates in the last four columns of Table 2 that employ dyad fixed effects, there
is limited evidence of significant trade erosion in the first six years. Trade levels persisting
many years after independence are inconsistent with explanations (1) and (2).
We observe that independence reduces colony trade with the metropole. But what
happens to colonial trade with other countries in the colonial empire (siblings) as well
as rest-of-world (RoW) countries? As is the case with trade with the metropole, trade
between siblings may decline suddenly due to trade preference cessation or gradually due
to deterioration in colonial networks and institutions. There are a couple of reasons to
expect that trade might increase with RoW countries. First, rising trading costs with
the metropole and siblings could divert trade to other countries. Second, the metropole
might have constrained the ability of colonies to trade with RoW countries prior to
independence.15 To measure the impact of years of independence on trade with each type
15Bonfatti (2008) develops a Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade between a colony, metropole, and third
country that predicts that independence is more likely for colonies with good trading opportunities with
the rest of world. An implication of the analysis is that independence should be accompanied by increased
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of country, we estimate distinct independence effects for a colony’s trade with metropole,
siblings, and RoW countries. We deem a sibling relationship to be severed when the
first of a pair of siblings gains independence. Years since independence for a sibling dyad
is calculated as the current year minus the year of severance. For colony-RoW dyads,
years since independence is the current year minus the year that the colony became
independent.16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
−
1.
5
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
Years since independence
Ch
an
ge
 in
 tr
ad
e 
(lo
g p
oin
ts)
Rest of World
Siblings
Metropole
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
8
1
tra
de
 ra
tio
 (r
ela
tiv
e t
o p
re−
ind
ep
.)
Figure 5: Independence effects on colonial trade with metropole, “siblings,” and the rest
of the world
Figure 5 portrays the estimates of the 21 independence variables (seven intervals, 3
types of relationship). They are based on the dyadic, fixed-effect specification used in
trade with the third country (RoW).
16Some countries were colonized by a succession of metropoles. For example, Papua New Guinea
(PNG) became independent from Great Britain in 1901, Germany in 1915, and Australia in 1975. For
PNG-RoW dyads, years since independence is the current year minus 1975, the year it was no longer
subject to colonial rule.
23
column (3) of Tables 1 and 2, rather than the tetrad method. The tetrad method elim-
inates monadic effects, which reflect a country’s general trading propensity in a given
year. However, it is the changes in a colony’s general trading propensity following inde-
pendence that we intend to capture using the RoW independence variables. The figure
shows each of the seven independence intervals as a step function and also shows the
95% confidence interval around the point estimate. The left axis shows the coefficient
estimate and the right axis converts the estimate to the ratio of post-independence trade
to pre-independence trade.
The coefficients for trade with the metropole are similar to those from Table 2: After
about a decade in which trade does not change significantly, a gradual erosion begins
that results in a more than 60% reduction in trade after three decades of independence.17
For siblings we find strong trade erosion as well. In contrast to trade with the metropole,
however, statistically significant reductions in trade occur in the first and second year
post-independence. The reductions strengthen for two decades before flattening out at
almost 80% below the level seen at and before the year of independence. In the case
of colony trade with RoW, Figure 5 reveals small, significant increases in trade in the
first decade after independence—a 14% increase in the 7–11 years interval—that becomes
negative and significant for 20–50 years after independence. In the long run (more than
50 years) RoW trade is not significantly different from the year of independence.
We interpret the gradual trade erosion observed between siblings as evidence that
the trade-enhancing “capital” (networks and institutions) associated with empires en-
couraged inter-sibling trade and that this capital depreciates after independence. The
estimates of larger trade contraction for siblings than metropoles is surprising. However,
the confidence intervals for metropole and sibling independence estimates overlap with
each other 30 years after independence. Contrary to the hypothesis that empires acted
17The coefficients for the control variables differ very little from the estimates report in column (3) of
Tables 1.
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as constraints on pre-independence trade diversification of colonies, we find only modest
and transitory increases with RoW countries.
Previous research has shown that immigrants are associated with increased trade with
their countries of birth (see Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998) for early evidence).
The interpretation of this result is that immigrant networks mitigate “informational”
barriers to trade. The pattern of independence effects may result from the gradual decline
of expatriate populations, leading to the erosion of business networks. We scrutinize this
proposition by compiling data on French nationals living abroad.18 The data covers
expatriates in 153 countries over the 1965–2006 period. Substantial numbers of French
nationals resided in France’s colonies. For instance, in 1965, there were about 137,000,
90,000, and 60,000 expatriates in Morocco, Algeria and Madagascar, respectively.
To investigate the hypothesis that declining networks underlie the observed trade
erosion, we first examine how expatriate populations in the French Empire change subse-
quent to independence and then add expatriate populations as an additional covariate in
bilateral trade regressions. The first three columns of Table 3 focus on colony-metropole
relations and the second three columns focus on sibling relations. In all specifications,
we exclude observations involving RoW countries (those outside the French Empire).
Columns (1) and (4) display estimates of the effects of independence on expatriate pop-
ulations. The other columns use bilateral trade as the dependent variable. All speci-
fications include fixed effects for dyads and years and the control variables reported in
column (3) of Table 1.
Column (1), where the dependent variable is specified as the log of the expat pop-
ulation, reveals that the number of French living in colonies falls steadily after inde-
pendence. French expat data is only available after independence so here the reference
period is the population of expats 1–2 years after independence. The effects cumulate
18We are very grateful to Bernard Gentil for making this data from the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs available to us and helping us with the extraction and understanding of this data.
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Table 3: French expatriates and trade within the French Empire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Colony-Metropole Siblings
Depvar: Expats Trade Trade Expats Trade Trade
3–6 Years -0.484c -0.462c -0.324
(0.263) (0.254) (0.272)
7–11 Years -0.570b -0.502b -0.341 -0.022 -0.021 -0.064
(0.253) (0.239) (0.254) (0.065) (0.184) (0.183)
12–19 Years -0.713b -0.923a -0.718b -0.175b -0.845a -0.871a
(0.285) (0.291) (0.315) (0.084) (0.278) (0.276)
20–29 Years -1.317a -1.263a -0.885a -0.830a -1.232a -1.169a
(0.371) (0.323) (0.343) (0.115) (0.317) (0.319)
30–49 Years -2.058a -1.787a -1.198a -1.618a -1.399a -1.219a
(0.518) (0.399) (0.401) (0.137) (0.365) (0.373)
50+ Years -1.785a -1.698a -1.190b -1.333a -1.109a -0.995b
(0.576) (0.453) (0.464) (0.158) (0.40) (0.405)
Expats 0.290a 0.206a
(0.077) (0.072)
N 1153 2299 2299 13319 15549 15549
R2 0.354 0.592 0.605 0.395 0.181 0.184
RMSE 0.414 0.651 0.640 .538 1.642 1.639
Note: Expats measured as the log of expat population in the colony in columns (1) and
(3) and the sum of the log expat populations in columns (4) and (6). Standard
errors in parentheses with a, b and c respectively denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. All specifications include the full set of controls, dyad
fixed effects, and dyad-clustered standard errors.
over time, bottoming out 30–49 years after independence, when expat populations are
13% (= exp(−2.058)) of their average level in the reference period.
Trade between France and its colonies exhibits independence effects that are very
similar in magnitude and timing to the declines seen for expats. As shown in column (2)
of Table 3, the reduction in trade is strongest after three decades, with the former colony
trading just 17% of the level in the reference period. This trade erosion is larger than the
amount estimated for the full sample (shown in Figure 5), where the estimated coefficients
imply that three decades after independence trade has eroded to 30% of the level 1–2
years after independence. Column (3) reveals that declining expat populations account
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for some of the decline in trade after independence. The coefficient on the log of the expat
population is significant and equal to 0.290, implying a 10% reduction in expats leads
to about a 3% reduction in bilateral trade. This estimate lies within the range obtained
in the immigration and trade literature.19 The coefficients on the independence intervals
fall in column (3) relative to column (2). After accounting for the effect of declines in
expats, the reduction in trade due to 30 years of independence falls from 83% to 70%.
The relationships between expats, trade, and independence extend to siblings. Each
observation used in the specifications in the last three columns of the table consists of
a pair of French colonies. Here we are interested in how French expatriates affect trade
between the countries in which they reside.20 To take into account expat populations
in both siblings, we redefine the expat variable as the sum of the logs of each sibling’s
population of French nationals.21 Column (4) shows that the redefined variable falls
steadily after independence. Recall that we designate the year the first colony leaves
the empire as the independence date for the sibling pair. Unlike the colony-metropole
regressions in the previous three columns, we do not observe any transitions from 1–2
years of independence to 3–6 years of independence, and thus our reference group in now
the period 3–6 years after independence. Columns (5) and (6) reveal that declines in
expat populations explain some of the trade erosion between siblings. In column (6), the
coefficient on log expats is 0.206, one-third smaller than the coefficient in column (3).
As a consequence, expat populations account for a smaller amount of trade erosion. The
reduction in trade between siblings due to 30 years of independence (relative to the 3–6
year reference group) falls from 67% to 63%.
The gradual decline in trade cumulating over three decades, may be a result of a similar
declines in business networks, for which expat populations may constitute an important
19See Table 1 of Wagner et al (2002).
20This exercise is similar to that of Rauch and Trindade (2002) who find that overseas Chinese popu-
lations promote trade, particularly for differentiated products, which they interpret as a network effect.
21We also redefine population and per-capita income as the sum of the logs of each sibling pair.
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element. Table 3 reveals that trade and expat populations follow correlated patterns of
decline in the wake of independence. Explicitly including expats into a trade regression
reduces, but does not eliminate, the trade erosion captured by the independence intervals.
The circumstances of the dissolution of colonial ties varied greatly. Some colonies
fought wars to obtain their independence whereas others exited from empires with min-
imal acrimony. For example, Algeria’s independence from France in 1962 involved a
protracted conflict whereas Senegal’s 1960 independence occurred peacefully. We would
expect hostile independence events to cause more trade disruption than amicable ones.
Indeed, it is possible that amicable separations do not depress trade at all and that the
results we have obtained so far are averages of negative consequences of hostile separa-
tions and zero effects for amicable ones. We test these propositions by categorizing the
independence events as peaceful or hostile. Of the 220 independence events in our data
set, we categorized 154 as amicable and 66 as hostile.22 However, limiting the sample to
events that provide times series information in our period of study, those occurring after
1900, we have 131 amicable and 43 hostile separations.
Figure 6 presents estimated independence coefficients for separations involving con-
flicts in panel (a), whereas panel (b) shows the results for non-hostile separations. The
first result to note is that hostile separations lead to larger declines in trade with the
metropole than amicable separations. The dynamics differ as well. Hostile separations
have larger immediate effects—which are statistically significant just two years after in-
dependence. In contrast, it takes more than two decades for amicable separations to
lead to statistically significant trade reductions with the metropole. These findings are
consistent with our network capital explanation of independence effects. We interpret
hostile separations as abruptly destroying social capital between the two countries. In
contrast, amicable separations seem to reduce trade via gradual depreciation.
22We started with information listed in the “Territorial Change” database (Tir, Schafer, and Diehl,
1998) from the Correlates of Wars project and used internet sources (the CIA Factbook, BBC country
briefs, and Wikipedia) to complete the classification, shown in Table 4.
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Figure 6: Independence effects depend on type of separation
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(a) Hostile separations (b) Amicable separations
After 50 years of independence, trade relationships between former colony and metropole
(the black lines in each panel) appear to converge in the range of 20–30% of pre-independence
trade. Thus, the amount of long-run trade erosion does not depend on the way indepen-
dence was achieved. The blue lines designating sibling trade after independence reveal
more long-run trade destruction for hostile separations, but the standard errors of these
estimates are large. Examining trade with the rest of world (RoW), we see short-run
increases for both types of separation. Hostile separations result in more with RoW
countries after 50 years. Amicable separations are associated with a relatively small
(20%) but significant reduction in long-run trade with RoW. Thus, in contrast with hos-
tile separations, colonies that exited amicably did not replace lost trade within the empire
with additional trade outside it.
29
5 Conclusion
We find that independence reduces colonial trade with the metropole and other countries
in the colonial empire. On average, trade between a colony and its metropole and siblings
is reduced by more than 60% after 30 years of independence. The trade erosion is even
more pronounced in the case of hostile separations. The trade deterioration associated
with independence, however, only partially offsets the long-term advantage of having a
colonial history with a trading partner.
If the newly established government of an independent country implemented trade-
restricting commercial policies, we would expect an immediate and permanent reduction
in trade. We do not observe immediate reductions in trade with the metropole. The
observed erosion in trade that cumulates over an extended time period subsequent to
independence suggests other forces at work. In particular, trade networks embodied in
individuals with knowledge of trading opportunities may have deteriorated over time.
Our evidence showing that decreases in the number of French living abroad explain a
portion of the post-independence trade deterioration supports this view.
The observed erosion in colonial trade can be explained by higher trade costs, ar-
guably due to the deterioration of trade networks. Higher trade costs reduce welfare
for the former colony via two channels. First, consumers pay higher prices for imports.
Second, producers have less access to markets (referred to as market potential in the
economic geography literature). Welfare costs of higher trade costs within the former
empire would have been mitigated, if there were easily accessible alternative sources of
supply and demand. Our results show little evidence of expanded trade by former colonies
with the rest of the world. Thus, the long-run contraction of trade of former colonies
suggests deleterious welfare effects of independence. A full accounting of welfare changes
would require a structural model as well as consideration of the internal consequences of
independence.
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Appendix: Gravity controls and independence dates
GDPs and populations come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). Note that in accordance to trade flows, GDPs are not deflated. Since the WDI
excludes Taiwan, we use national data sources. WDI also starts in 1960 and sometimes
does not keep track of countries that ceased to exit, or changed definitions. Typically,
WDI has Russian GDP starting in 1989. In order to correct both problems, we com-
plement WDI with population estimates provided by Angus Maddison (http://www.
ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_10-2006.xls). Fur-
thermore, we also use the 1948–1992 GDP estimates collected by Katherine Barbieri and
made available by the Correlates of War project (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/).
RTAs are constructed from three main sources: Table 3 of Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) supplemented with the WTO web site (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/region_e/summary_e.xls) and qualitative information contained in Frankel (1997).
GATT/WTO membership of different countries over time comes from the WTO web
site. The data on currency unions are an updated and extended version of the list pro-
vided by Glick and Rose (2002). Data on common legal origins of the two countries
are available from Andrei Shleifer at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
shleifer/Data/qgov_web.xls. Bilateral distances and common (official) language come
from the CEPII distance database (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.
htm). We use the population-weighted great circle distance between large cities of the
two countries.
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Table 4: Metropoles, colonies, and independence events since 1900
UK Ghana 1957 Cambodia 1953 S Africa 1902†
Bermuda — Malaysia 1957 Syria 1946† Austria
Falklands — Sudan 1956 Lebanon 1943 Bosnia 1918†
Gibraltar — Eritrea 1952 Russia Croatia 1918†
St Helena — Israel 1948 Armenia 1991 Czechia 1918†
Hong Kong 1997 Burma 1948 Azerbaijan 1991 Slovenia 1918†
Brunei 1984 Sri Lanka 1948 Belarus 1991 Japan
St Kitts 1983 Bangladesh 1947 Estonia 1991 Korea, N 1945†
Antigua 1981 India 1947 Georgia 1991 Korea, S 1945†
Belize 1981 Pakistan 1947 Kazakhstan 1991 Palau 1945†
Vanuatu 1980 Jordan 1946 Kyrgyzstan 1991 Taiwan 1945†
Zimbabwe 1980 Iraq 1932 Latvia 1991 Belgium
Kiribati 1979 Egypt 1922 Moldova 1991 Burundi 1962
St Vincent 1979 Ireland 1921† Tajikistan 1991 Rwanda 1962
St. Lucia 1979 Afghanistan 1919† Turkmenistan 1991 Zaire 1960
Dominica 1978 S Africa 1910 Ukraine 1991 Denmark
Solomon Is. 1978 N Zealand 1907 Uzbekistan 1991 Faroe Is —
Tuvalu 1978 Australia 1901 Lithuania 1990 Greenland —
Seychelles 1976 Papua 1901 Finland 1917 Iceland 1944
Grenada 1974 France Greece Italy
Bahamas 1973 F Guiana — Cyprus — Somalia 1960
Bahrain 1971 F Polynesia — Armenia 1920† Libya 1951
Qatar 1971 Guadeloupe — Lebanon 1920† Eritrea 1941†
UAE 1971 Martinique — Yemen 1918 Australia
Fiji 1970 N Caledonia — Syria 1917† Papua 1975
Tonga 1970 Reunion — Iraq 1916† Nauru 1968
Mauritius 1968 St Pierre — Albania 1912 USA
Nauru 1968 Vanuatu 1980 Macedonia 1912† Palau 1994
Swaziland 1968 Djibouti 1977 Libya 1911† Philippines 1946
Yemen 1967 Comoros 1975 Germany Yugoslavia
Barbados 1966 Algeria 1962† Burundi 1918† Bosnia 1995†
Botswana 1966 Benin 1960 Namibia 1918† Slovenia 1991†
Guyana 1966 Burkina Faso 1960 Poland 1918† China
Lesotho 1966 Cameroon 1960 Rwanda 1918† Mongolia 1921†
Gambia 1965 C African Rep 1960 Papua 1915† Ethiopia
Maldives 1965 Chad 1960 Nauru 1914† Eritrea 1993†
Malawi 1964 Congo 1960 Palau 1914† Greece
Malta 1964 Cote D’Ivoire 1960 Samoa 1914 Cyprus —
Tanzania 1964 Gabon 1960 Portugal Hungary
Zambia 1964 Madagascar 1960 Macao 1999 Slovakia 1918†
Kenya 1963 Mali 1960 Angola 1975† N Zealand
Singapore 1963 Mauritania 1960 Cape Verde 1975 Samoa 1962
Jamaica 1962 Niger 1960 Mozambique 1975 Pakistan
Trinidad 1962 Senegal 1960 Sao Tome 1975 Bangladesh 1971†
Uganda 1962 Togo 1960 Guinea-Bissau 1974 S Africa
Kuwait 1961 Guinea 1958 Netherlands Namibia 1990†
Sierra Leone 1961 Morocco 1956 Aruba — Spain
Cyprus 1960 Tunisia 1956 N Antilles — Eq Guinea 1968
Nigeria 1960 Laos 1954† Suriname 1975
Somalia 1960 Viet Nam 1954† Indonesia 1949†
Note: Metropole = colonizer, — = current colony, † = hostile separation
